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Introduction  
The external displacement of more than six million Syrian nationals since 
the start of the civil war in 2011 is a humanitarian tragedy. The impact has 
been most keenly felt in neighbouring countries including Jordan, Iraq, 
Tukey and Lebanon where Syrian nationals now comprise an estimated one 
in five of the population. There is a considerable disparity in the global 
response to Syrian refugees with Europe receiving only 6% of those 
externally displaced by 2014.1 Although the number of arrivals in the EU 
increased significantly in 2015-16, the number of Syrian asylum seekers 
and refugees in the EU remains less than 0.2% of the European population.2 
Nevertheless this ‘crisis’ has repeatedly been described as the biggest, 
most divisive issue facing the European Union today.3 
This article examines the framing of Europe’s response to this humanitarian 
need and the impact of these frames on durable solutions that can protect 
those most in need. It is suggested, drawing on the successful re-framing 
of the gay marriage debate, that the way such an event is conceptualised 
can have a significant impact on political commitments and the response of 
host communities.4 It is argued that  the framing of the Syrian 
displacement, through constant iteration in public discourse, as a migrant 
‘crisis’ to be addressed through burden sharing, containment and 
compulsory quotas, has hindered durable solutions whilst confirming 
negative stereotypes that have prejudiced the ability of refugees to receive 
protection.  
                                                 
1 Nicole Ostrand ‘The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison Of Responses By German, 
Sweden, Uk and US’ (2015) 3 Journal of Migration and Human Security, 225-279.  
2 According to Eurostat figures, the population of the EU is 508 million and the number 
of Syrian nationals seeking asylum in the EU since the start of the civil war is estimated 
by the UNHCR to be in the region of one million (less than 0.2% of the EU population). 
3 Dogachan Dagi ‘EU Refugee Crisis: From Supranationalism to intergovernmentalism?’ 
(2018) 3 Journal of Liberty and International Affairs 3, 12 
4 Nat Kendall-Taylor ‘To Advance More Humane Refugee Policies We Must Reframe The 
Debate’ Open Democracy (28.6.16).  
The application of a crisis frame could not have come at a worse time for 
the European institutions as extremist political parties, that have been 
gaining ground over the last decade, use their own framing narrative to 
conceptualise the largely Muslim Syrian arrivals as threats to European 
culture and identity.5 Neo-conservative writers, such as Douglas Murray 
have attempted to give an academic rigour to the ‘Islamic threat’ 
perspective by constructing a conflict of values. Yet the nature of European 
culture and values in such narratives is rarely articulated.6 Rather, in a 
questionable interpretation of European history, it is constructed as entirely 
oppositional (non-Muslim, non-immigrant). The European values 
articulated in the Treaty on the European Union (1992) are conspicuously 
absent: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail7 
 
The oppositional narrative has served the new populist parties well as the 
European project is openly rejected in preference for national solidarity and 
minimal intergovernmental cooperation. The authority of the European 
Union is further challenged as established political actors look inwards in 
an attempt to dilute the popularity of nationalist rhetoric. The ability of the 
European institutions to exert pressure on Governments that fail in their 
commitment to European values has been compromised by recent events. 
The UK’s decision to leave the EU has emboldened populist parties on the 
                                                 
5 Leo Cendrowicz ‘Refugee Crisis. Why Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban Sticks To 
His Anti-Muslim Script’ The Independent (Sept 4th 2016); Dagi supra n3, 13.  
6 Douglas Murray The Strange Death of Europe. Immigration, identity, Islam 
(Bloomsbury 2017)   
7 Article 2, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union OJ C326, 26.10.2012, 
13–390 
right and left. Populist MEP Nigel Farage became Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban’s biggest defender before the European Parliament’s vote of 
censure. However, it is notable that British conservative MEPs were the only 
representatives of a ruling government in support for Orban, taking the 
opportunity to reject European interference in domestic politics.8   
 
There is an international right to seek and enjoy asylum provided in Article 
14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.9 The right has to be 
exercised outside of the country of origin, thus movement is the first step 
to realising protection.10 Most Syrians arriving in Europe are irregular 
migrants in the sense that they do not have entry visas and are not 
beneficiaries of UNHCR resettlement programmes. Many will have credible 
claims for asylum or humanitarian protection once they access an asylum 
procedure, contradicting suggestions that most are criminals and 
terrorists.11 Indeed, statistics suggest that 80% of Syrian asylum seekers 
will be granted some form of protection status in Europe12. However, their 
irregular status has meant convoluted and dangerous methods of travel, 
which has made it easier for them to be grouped together as a collective 
threat to European culture, security and the economy. 
 
Having identified the framing of Europe’s response to the Syrian 
displacement, it will be argued that constructive, cooperative policy 
initiatives were stymied by the repeated confirmation of this frame through 
a public discourse that exploited public anxieties over security and crime. 
                                                 
8 Nigel Farage in the European Parliament ‘Thank God for Viktor Orban’ 12th Sept 2018. 
Full speech available on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BxJdYNEcMmc 
[Last accessed 22nd Feb 2019] 
9 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A, 10th December 1948 
10 A refugee is defined by Article 1A of the Refugee Convention 1951 as being, inter alia, 
outside his country of origin. 
11 B Miltner ‘The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: A Clash Of The Titans’ Obligations?’ 
(2015) XXII Brown Journal of World Affairs 1, 213; Jeff Crisp ‘Refugees” The Trojan 
Horse Of Terrorism’ Open Democracy (June 5th 2017) 
12 Eurostat figures compiled by Phillip Conor ‘After record migration, 80% of Syrian 
asylum applicants approved to stay in Europe’ (Pew Research Centre Oct 2nd 2017). The 
comparative figures from Aug 2017 are 68% for Eritrean nationals, 38% for Somali 
nationals and 36% for Iraqi and Sudanese nationals. 
The ‘crisis’ frame and its associated metaphors resulted in emergency, 
reactive measures that effectively led to the abdication of human rights and 
humanitarian obligations.  
 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the crisis frame and its component 
security narrative, has paradoxically made Europe less secure as many 
millions of Syrian nationals, who have credible protection claims, are now 
left in limbo – unable to return home or build a new life in Europe. The EU-
Turkey deal has resulted in more than three million Syrians residing in 
Turkey13; some are accommodated in government camps, but the vast 
majority are living precariously in urban areas. Although they now receive 
a cash allowance from EU funding that covers accommodation and food, 
none are able to make a claim for refugee status in Turkey. Thousands 
more who arrived in Greece prior to the deal in March 2016, remain trapped 
in squalid camps awaiting family reunion or determination of their asylum 
case. A much smaller number have succeeded in gaining protection as part 
of the EU resettlement scheme or national schemes, such as the Vulnerable 
Persons Relocation Scheme in the UK or private sponsorship in Germany. 
It will further be argued that despite a significant reduction in new arrivals, 
the crisis frame continues to dictate European asylum policy and crucially, 
the repeated affirmation of the frame has normalised policy responses that 
were previously rejected for their failure to respect human rights and 
protect the right to seek asylum. 
In conclusion it will be argued that there is an urgent need to re-frame the 
demand for protection to accommodate an empathic focus centred on 
human rights, tolerance and global cooperation, grounded in international 
humanitarian obligations that promote peace and security for all.  
 
 
                                                 
13 European Council 18th March 2016, Available at : 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-
statement/ (last accessed 20th February 2019) 
Anatomy of displacement 
Since the start of the civil war in 2011 over six million Syrians have sought 
refuge outside the country. There have been suggestions that external 
displacement was a deliberate strategy of the Assad government and 
Iranian allies in an attempt to cleanse the country of critics and non-Sunni 
Muslims.14 
The majority of those leaving are accommodated in the region of origin with 
considerable impact on host communities. The resources needed to support 
both refugees and host communities are far greater than the donations 
received. There are now over one million Syrian refugees living in Lebanon, 
three-quarters of whom are recognised as living in extreme poverty.15 
Whilst the EU’s Regional MADAD fund has contributed 550 million euros to 
various projects in Lebanon, the World Bank has estimated the cost at 1.6 
billion euros per year.16 Jordan has received more than 660,000 Syrian 
refugees, over half of whom are children.17 This has doubled the size of the 
Syrian population in Jordan and the pressure on jobs and resources has 
caused considerable strain on community relations.18 Last year the UNHCR 
                                                 
14 Martin Chulov ‘Iran Repopulates Syria With Shia Muslims To Help Tighten Regime's 
Control’ Guardian Online (14th Jan 2017) 
15 The annual vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees reveals that 58 per cent of all 
households are now living in extreme poverty – on less than us $2.87 per person per 
day. this is some 5 per cent more than a year ago. 76 per cent of refugee households 
are living below this level. UNHCR ‘Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon’ (UNHCR Dec 2017). Available at:   
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/61312#_ga=2.195784239.228949351.15
37197420-2021353763.1537197420 [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019] 
16 World Bank estimate available at: Http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2014/09/12/world-bank-run-trust-fund-targets-municipalities-to-offset-
spillovers-of-syrian-crisis [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019];  Radka Havlova and Krystna 
Tamchynova ‘The Uncertain role of the EU countries in the Syrian refugee Crisis’ (2016) 
18 Insight Turkey 2, 85-106. For current projects operated  under the EU Madad 
Programme see: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/madad_fund_signed_contracts_20_april_2018.pdf.  
17 UNHCR Factsheet Feb 2018. Available at: 
https://data2.Unhcr.Org/en/documents/download/62241 [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019] 
18 Havlova and Tamchynova supra n16. The Jordanian Minister for the Interior described 
this as equivalent to the United States absorbing the entire population of Canada in 
Norimitsu Onishi ‘As Syrian Refugees Develop Roots, Jordan Grows Wary’ New York 
Times (5th Oct 2013) 
reported that 94% of required funding to assist the refugee population in 
Jordan had not been received.19 
 
Who should offer protection? 
Despite the hospitality of the immediate region, there has been criticism of 
wealthier Gulf states for failing to offer protection. In reply, the Saudi 
government argues that they have provided hospitality to some 2.5 million 
Syrian ’guests’ since the start of the war.20 Other estimates put the figure 
at closer to 500,000 and it is evident that most will have temporary status 
either as workers or recipients of sponsorship.21 Further, the suggestion 
that hospitality can be a replacement for formal recognition of refugee 
status is worrying, particularly as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the 
UAE have not ratified the Refugee Convention.    
There are of course reasonable arguments for trying to keep refugees in 
neighbouring countries, particular where those countries share a common 
language, religion and culture. It will be easier for arrivals to integrate and 
to establish a life in such circumstances. Yet this can only be argued to the 
extent that the number of arrivals is manageable and the financial support 
available from the international community is adequate. Where such 
support is not available the arrival of large numbers can have a damaging 
impact on stability as conflicts can quickly escalate to absorb neighbouring 
countries.  
A further argument for greater responsibility outside the region, is the 
nature of the conflict in Syria and the inability of the UN Security Council 
to protect civilians from the regime’s aggression.22 Indeed, with the direct 
involvement of countries outside the immediate region, including the US, 
France, Russia and the UK, the conflict in Syria has become a global conflict. 
                                                 
19 Onishi Ibid., 
20 The Saudi Arabia Foreign Ministry:  
http://www.arab.news.com/featured/news/805236 [last accessed Dec 31st 2019] 
21 Sari Hanafi ‘Gulf Response To The Syrian Refugee Crisis. Facts, Debates And Fatwas’ 
[2017] 5 Sociology Of Islam, 112-137  
22 Nigel White Journal of Rights and Justice   
It is argued that there are both moral and legal obligations arising from the 
foreseeable consequences of this intervention.  
Due diligence is a principle of customary international law that requires 
states to engage in reasonable efforts to prevent harm caused by other 
states or non-state actors.23 It is certainly arguable that principles applied 
in the context of transboundary environmental damage could be used to 
suggest the emergence of a more general rule. The International Court of 
Justice has ruled that there is a requirement under international law to 
undertake an environmental impact assessment when there is a risk of a 
proposed  activity having a ”significant adverse impact in a transboundary 
context”.24 This extends the application of an earlier case that applied the 
same principle to industrial activities, i.e. that where there is a risk of 
significant adverse impact from a proposed action there is an obligation to 
undertake a full impact assessment. It could therefore be suggested, 
applying the surrogacy principle of international refugee law and borrowing 
from other areas of international law, that all states have a general duty to 
refrain from actions which will foreseeably cause population 
displacement.25  
In the context of state action or inaction in situations of genocide, the ICJ’s 
decision in Bosnia v Serbia found that although the Serbia government were 
not directly responsible for the massacre of Bosnian civilians at Srebrenica, 
they had responsibility for manifestly failing to take all measures within 
their power to prevent genocide.26 Whilst genocide is of course a particular 
                                                 
23 As confirmed by the International Court of Justice in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina v Uruguay) (Merits) [2010] ICJ Rep 55-56, para 101. Antal Berkes ‘The 
Standard of ‘Due Diligence’ as a Result of Interchange between the Law of Armed 
Conflict and General International Law’ [2018] 23 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 
3, 433–46 
24 The Pulp Mills case [2010] is cited with approval by the ICJ in Costa Rica v Nicaragua 
[2018], para 104. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/150/150-
20180202-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf ([last accessed 22nd Feb 2019] 
25 An example of an international obligation to prevent a violation of international law 
can be found in Article 100 of the International Convention on the Law of the Sea 
regarding an obligation to cooperate in the repression of piracy, notwithstanding the 
absence of a clear jurisdictional link. I am very grateful for the comments made by Dr 
Mark Chadwick on this point.  
26 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro [2007] ICJ 2  
heinous crime under international law, it is at least arguable that this 
position could be extended to population displacement exacerbated 
through conflict intervention. Davidovic similarly argues that responsibility 
is greater where foreseeable displacement is caused in part by one’s own 
action.27  
In Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer argues that although the interests of 
communal self-determination can limit obligations to refugees, there is a 
specific moral responsibility where displacement is caused by ones own 
actions. Such a responsibility should not be delimited by arguments 
concerning costs or numbers.28 He gives the example of Russians displaced 
in the West and forcibly repatriated after World War II.29 
It is well established that an obligation to admit an asylum seeker for the 
purpose of examining the merits of the case arises at the border of the host 
state. This obligation is extended by Singer and Singer who argue that there 
is no obvious moral distinction between refusing someone at the border and 
failing to resettle a person from a refugee camp.30 They argue that the 
international community should take active steps to offer protection to 
refugees living in camps rather than waiting for refugees to arrive at their 
border.  
Leaving aside the difficulty in ascribing state responsibility in the latter 
situation, there is also a legal distinction between these two positions. 
Where an asylum seeker arrives at the border and seeks protection, 
international human rights and refugee law combine to require the state, 
de minimis, to admit them with a view to determining any risk of 
refoulement should they be returned.31 
                                                 
27 Jovana Davidovic ‘What Do We Owe Refugees: Jus Ad Bellum, Duties To Refugees 
From Armed Conflict Zones And The Right To Asylum’ (2016) 12 Journal Of Global 
Ethics 3, 347-364 
28 Michael Walzer Spheres of Justice (New York Basic Books 1983), 51  
29 Joseph Carens ‘Refugees and the Limit of Obligations’ (1992) 6 Public Affairs Quarterly 
1,31 
30 Peter Singer and Renata Singer ‘The Ethics of Refugee Policy’ in Mark Gibney (ed.) 
Open Borders? Closed Societies (Greenwood, New York 1988) 111-130 
31 See Article 33 Refugee Convention 1951. Comparable human rights obligations can be 
found in Article 3 of the ECHR as applied in Hirsi Jamaa v Italy and MSS v Belgium and 
Greece, and Article 3 of the International Convention Against Torture.   
International refugee law is predicated on the surrogacy principle whereby 
the failure of one state to protect its citizens should be remedied by the 
actions of other states in the global community.32 The Refugee Convention 
itself does not guarantee a decent standard of living; rather it seeks 
primarily to protect refugees from refoulement i.e. serious threats to their 
life or freedom.33 It is therefore possible that a refugee camp could be 
compliant with this obligation. Other material rights listed in the 
Convention, including access to education, housing and employment, 
depend largely on existing conditions in the host state. Refugees should not 
receive ‘less favourable’ treatment, but where the host population is 
already impoverished this may not provide much comfort.          
For those Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries there is a slim chance 
of benefitting from a UNHCR resettlement programme. Faced with the 
insecurity and uncertainty of camp life, many have embarked on the long 
and dangerous journey to the relative peace and security of Europe. Seen 
in this light, the decision to migrate beyond the region is both 
understandable and foreseeable. Yet the response of the European 
institutions, many Member States and much of the media, suggests 
otherwise.  
 
The importance of the policy frame   
Frames impose structure on political issues and policies. Winter argues that 
there is a symbiotic relationship between elite framing rhetoric and public 
opinion.34 Whilst the frame lends structure to issues, helping to develop a 
coherent narrative; cognitive schemas structure our understanding of social 
categories by linking together their various attributes to produce a coherent 
                                                 
32 Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam The Refugee in International Law (OUP 2007, 3rd 
edition) 10 
33 Article 33(2) Refugee Convention 1951, Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly 
34 Nicholas J G Winter Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race And Gender Shape 
Public Opinion (University of Chicago Press, 2008) 
story. When the frame and the cognitive schema align an analogy is created 
which drives public opinion.35  
The role of the media in establishing and maintaining frames in times of 
uncertainty is significant.36 Van Dijk goes further in arguing that whilst the 
mass media can be accused of disseminating potentially prejudiced ideology, 
it also constructs and reconstructs public attitudes and ‘knowledges’.37  
In matters relating to migration the influence of both quality and tabloid media 
on public attitudes has been well-documented.38 The tendency to prefer 
stories that are accessible to readers results in an emphasis on 
‘conventional understandings of a situation, on accounts that can be quickly 
and easily portrayed, and on the most plausible explanations’39. As a 
consequence, there is an editorial preference for stories that are proximate, 
large and contain an element of conflict.40 For stories involving refugees 
this translates as crisis coverage where the immediate narrative centres on 
security, costs and numbers rather than the positive contribution refugees 
can make to host societies.41 
Although the exceptional nature of a crisis offers an opportunity to disrupt 
journalistic routines, providing a new frame, the coverage of the ‘refugee crisis’ 
was dominated by established narratives relating to terrorism, crime and 
vulnerability.42 When these frames are confounded by metaphors emphasising 
                                                 
35 Supra n34, at 146  
36 Elizabeth M Perse Media Effects and Society (London Routledge, 2001) 81; see also 
Andrea Lawlor ‘Framing Immigration in the Canadian and British News Media’ (2015) 
48 Canadian Journal of Political Science 2, 329–355.  
37 Teun Van Dijk ’The Discourse and Knowledge Interface’ in G Weiss and R Wodak 
(eds.) Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory and Interdisciplinarity (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 85-109  
38 See for example Teun Van Dijk Racism and the Press; Critical studies in Racism and 
Migration (Routledge 1991); Samantha Cooper, Erin Olejniczak, Caroline Lenette and 
Charlotte Smedley ‘Media Coverage Of Refugees And Asylum Seekers In Regional 
Australia; A Critical Discourse Analysis’ (2017) 162 Media International Australia 1, 78-
89; Majid Khosravinik ‘The Representation Of Refugees, Asylum Seekers And Immigrants 
In British Newspapers. A Discourse Analysis’ (2010) 9 Journal of Language and Politics 1  
39 Andrea Lawlor and Erin Tolley ‘Deciding Who’s Legitimate: News Media Framing of 
Immigrants and Refugees’ (2017) 11International Journal of Communication 969 
40 Ibid., 
41 Supra n38 
42 Esther Greussing and Hajo Boomgaarden ‘Shifting The Refugee Narrative? An 
Automated Frame Analysis Of Europe’s 2015 Refugee Crisis’ (2017) 43 Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 11, 1750  
the vast scale and ‘elemental forces’ at play (waves, tides, swarms),43 the 
humanitarian needs of the refugee are subsumed within a discourse of high 
drama. It is surprising how often these metaphors find their way into scholarly 
analysis, thus reaffirming their legitimacy. In an otherwise well-informed 
analysis of national sovereignty, Dagi refers to a ‘new immigration wave’ and 
a ‘refugee influx’ that ‘paralyzed’ policy makers.44  Not only will this discourse 
act to prevent a sustainable, managed solution but it can serve to legitimise 
actions which would otherwise be regarded as deeply unpleasant. This is an 
argument advanced in the context of the ‘just war’ frame in US public discourse 
by Butler.45  
Media coverage of migratory movements also adopts a hierarchy of 
acceptance. With white, Christian, able-bodied immigrants at one end of the 
spectrum and racial minority, non-Christian, non-Anglophone/Francophone 
migrants at the other end46.   
The research on media framing is evidenced in the public discourse on the 
Syrian displacement. Politicians of the Visegrad47 countries used the crisis 
frame very deliberately to make the strengthening of national borders a 
priority, arguing ‘external border protection must remain the top priority if we 
are to prevent the 2015 scenario …a crisis that questions the very foundations 
of the European Union’.48 
On some occasions however, public opinion appears to shift in response to a 
particular event, disrupting the normative frame and revealing problematic 
metaphors. Such an event occurred with the publication of images of Syrian 
toddler Aylan Kurdi, drowned and washed up on a Turkish beach 5km from 
                                                 
43 Paul Baker and Tony McEnery ‘A Corpus-Based Approach To Discourses Of Refugees 
And Asylum Seekers In UN And Newspaper Texts’ (2005) 4 Journal of Language and 
Politics 2, 197-226. 
44 Dagi, supra n3 
45 Michael J Butler Selling a ‘just’ war. Framing Legitimacy and US Intervention (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2012) 
46 Robert Ford, ‘Acceptable And Unacceptable Immigrants. How Opposition To 
Immigration In Britain Is Affected By Migrants’ Regions Of Origin’ (2011) 37 Journal of 
Ethic and Migration Studies 7, 1017-1037  
47 Czech Republic, Hungary Poland, Slovakia  
48 Cited in Henry Foy ‘Central Europe States Keep Migrant Heat On Athens’ Financial 
Times (Feb 15th 2016) 
Greece. The images posted on Twitter on the morning of 2nd September, 
quickly went viral having been published on the Guardian webpage that 
afternoon and reproduced in print media the following day.  
The emotional detachment that characterised the crisis/burden frames and the 
‘pity’ response was suddenly shaken as the public put pressure on their 
Governments to take action to protect rather than prevent refugees. D’Orazio 
analysed social media immediately after the story broke and observed a clear 
change in tweeting content, from a focus on migrants towards an interest in 
the plight of refugees.49 Opinion polls in France similarly showed a large shift 
in public opinion towards refugees after the publication of the image.50 In 
the UK the public outcry led Prime Minister David Cameron to change his policy 
on resettlement, significantly increasing the number of places offered to 
20,000.51 In Canada, where the extended Kurdi family were settled, the outcry 
is considered to have contributed to the defeat of the Conservative 
government in the October election.52 
This was undoubtedly a time when the public mood shifted towards 
compassion and empathy and it provided an opportunity for European 
cooperation that would prioritise protection and fundamental rights. The 
opportunity was short-lived. As David Cameron stressed the UK’s moral 
credentials,53 a more conservative response soon followed which focussed on 
the economic costs, the behaviour of other European countries and more 
specifically, the ‘irresponsible’ behaviour of the boy’s father. Ten days after the 
photograph was published, the tabloid Daily Express tried to reclaim the 
                                                 
49 Francesco D’Orazio ‘Journey of an Image: From a Beach in Bodrum to Twenty Million 
Screens Across the World’ in Farida Vis and Olga Goriunova (eds.) ‘The Iconic Image on 
Social Media: A Rapid Research Response to the Death of Aylan Kurdi’ Visual Social 
media Lab 2015. Available at:   
https://research.gold.ac.uk/14624/1/KURDI%20REPORT.pdf [last accessed 22nd Feb 
2019] 
50 Brian Love ‘French Opinion Rapidly Swings In Favor Of Refugees, Poll Shows Reuters 
(10th Sept 2015) 
51 Nicholas Watt ‘David Cameron Says UK Will Take Thousands More Syrian Refugees’ 
The Guardian (4th Feb 2015) 
52 Patrick Kingsley and Safak Timur ‘Stories Of 2015: How Alan Kurdi's Death Changed 
The World’ Guardian Online (31st Dec 2015) 
53 BBC News ‘Migrant Crisis: PM Sys UK Will Fulfil Moral Responsibilities’ BBC (3rd Sept 
2015) 
established narrative, publishing an exposé claiming that the boy’s father was 
the ‘people smuggler’ responsible for the death of five people, including his 
two sons and wife.54 This explanation, derived from the defence provided by 
the men charged with smuggling in Turkey, has never been proven and the 
case against Aylan’s father was dropped. 
Winter accepts that explicit elements of a particular frame may be rejected but 
he argues, it can be more difficult to reject implicit elements on a cognitive 
level. This is particularly relevant to the ‘refugee crisis’ frame which has been 
accepted and repeated by scholars, commentators and policy-makers as an 
adequate description of the events of 2015-16. It does not appear immediately 
offensive or problematic but when combined with pre-existing cognitive 
schema concerning social categories such as race and religion, as well as public 
anxieties over security and crime, the impact of the crisis frame on public 
discourse and policy is far from innocuous. 
 
Europe’s asylum framework: mutual trust and distrust 
Pursuant to the EU’s Common European Asylum System (hereafter CEAS) 
there has been a number of Directives that aim to establish common 
standards across the EU 28.55 Originally intended to establish minimum 
standards, the latest phase marked an upgrade to uniformity of protection. 
In theory an asylum applicant will be able to access equivalent asylum 
procedures and reception conditions whilst having a comparable 
opportunity to secure refugee status. As all Member States are deemed 
safe under the Aznar protocol56, there is an expectation, grounded in the 
Dublin Regulation, that the applicant will make their claim in the first state 
                                                 
54 Adrian Lee ‘Tragic Aylan Kurdi’s Father Was The People Smuggler Driving Doomed 
Boat, Claimed Survivor’ Daily Express Sept 15th 2015. Whilst two men were subsequently 
convicted of trafficking offences in Turkey, the case against the boy’s father was dropped for 
lack of evidence.   
55 It should be noted that the UK, Denmark and Ireland are not bound by all instruments 
under the CEAS having negotiated particular opt-in positions (beyond the scope of this 
paper). All three are however bound by the Dublin Regulation.  
56 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Protocol 
(No 24) on Asylum For Nationals Of Member States Of The European Union OJ C 115, 9th 
May 2008, p. 305–30 
of arrival and will not thereafter engage in secondary movement. There are 
some exceptions to this principle, but it is clear that asylum seekers cannot 
choose their ultimate destination. The absence of choice is supported by 
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention which provides that states shall not 
impose penalties on refugees ‘coming directly’ who enter unlawfully where 
they have good cause for so doing.  
If the exceptions do not apply, the Dublin Regulation operates by 
transferring asylum seekers who engage in secondary movement to the 
first European state of arrival. Geography dictates that this will be a country 
at the border of Europe. That country is then expected to process the 
application and comply with the obligations set out in the various 
Directives, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ‘ECHR’).  
 
Human rights obligations in the CEAS  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights57 is applicable to all actions of the 
European institutions and the actions of Member States when implementing 
European law, including the Dublin Regulation. Unlike the ECHR it includes 
specific guarantees for asylum seekers, notably Article 18 the right to 
asylum58, and Article 19(2) which prohibits refoulement. In addition, Article 
3 of the ECHR (which has its equivalent in Article 4 of the Charter) has been 
interpreted to include actions including expulsion or deportation, when 
there is a real risk that the individual will consequently experience 
treatment that is inhuman or degrading.59 Thus, the onus is on the sending 
state to ensure that conditions in the receiving state will not breach that 
threshold. The obligations under both instruments have been tested in 
                                                 
57 C 364/1 Official Journal Of The European Communities 18.12.2000 
58 It is interesting that the Charter has not adopted the ‘right to seek and enjoy’ asylum, 
as set out in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. it could be 
argued that the right to asylum is broader in that it implies a corollary obligation on 
receiving states.   
59 See for example Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413; and Soering v UK 161 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) (1989)  
cases concerning the operation of the CEAS with the resulting decisions 
pointing to flaws in the central assumption of European safety. 
In MSS v Belgium and Greece60 both respondent states were responsible 
for breaches of Article 3 and 13 of the ECHR where an Afghan asylum 
seeker was returned to Greece under the Dublin II mechanism. The 
deficiencies in the Greek asylum system were significant and the applicant 
had already experienced ill-treatment and destitution in Greece before 
being transferred. The Belgium government’s reliance on the presumption 
of European safety, was not considered by the European Court to be a 
sufficient justification given the extent of evidence concerning the failures 
of the Greek asylum system.61  
The Court of Justice of the EU (hereafter ‘CJEU’) applied the EU’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights in the case of NS v SSHD62 to a proposed Dublin 
transfer of another Afghan national to Greece. Although emphasising the 
principle of mutual trust and the presumption of compliance, the Court 
established that where substantial grounds existed for believing that there 
were ‘systemic failings’ in the asylum system of the receiving state, the 
transfer should not proceed. 
Whilst a great deal of criticism was focussed on the Greek asylum system, 
cases such as Tarakhel v Switzerland suggest that the problems are not 
confined to Greece. The ECtHR questioned the Italian government’s ability 
to protect the family life of a family of asylum seekers and ruled that the 
Swiss government would be in breach of Article 3 if they returned them 
without obtaining guarantees from the Italian authorities.63 The 
requirement to obtain such guarantees appears to conflict with the 
presumption of mutual trust but as the number of Dublin challenges before 
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the Strasbourg court increased it became incumbent on sending states to 
undertake such checks.  
In the British case EM (Eritrea) the Court of Appeal attempted to align the 
different European Court approaches by requiring that the applicants, who 
had experienced significant ill-treatment in Italy, produce evidence of 
systemic deficiencies in the Italian system. This approach was rejected by 
the Supreme Court which ruled that the correct legal test was whether 
there was a real risk of ill-treatment in Italy reaching the degree of severity 
required under Article 3.64  
In Mohamed v Austria65, the Court found a violation of the right to an 
effective remedy (Article 13) concerning a proposed return to Hungary 
where the applicant sought to argue that their treatment in Hungary would 
violate Article 3. Although Mohamed was ultimately unsuccessful in the 
Article 3 challenge, the last two years have seen a notable deterioration in 
the conditions experienced by asylum seekers in Hungary. The Austrian 
Federal Administrative Court has ruled that there is no guarantee that a 
Dublin returnee to Hungary would not be subjected to chain refoulement. 
Similarly, the Council of State in the Netherlands has prevented return on 
the basis that there are severe doubts as to whether transfer to Hungary 
would breach Article 3 of the ECHR and, thus, whether mutual trust could 
be upheld.66 The use of detention in the absence of international 
requirements of proportionality and good faith has been criticised by NGO’s 
and recognised in the jurisprudence of several national judicial bodies.67 
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Given the recent vote of censure in the European Parliament and the 
unwillingness of the Hungarian government to assist in the EU’s 
resettlement or relocation schemes, it seems unlikely that the fundamental 
rights of asylum seekers can be guaranteed in Hungary. Of particular 
concern is the asylum legislation introduced in autumn 2015. It created a 
legal basis for the construction of a fence on the border between Hungary 
and Serbia in conjunction with further legislative amendments criminalising 
irregular entry and damage to the fence.68 It has resulted in an extremely 
hostile environment, violating the international right to seek asylum, the 
right to effective access to procedures and the non-criminalisation of 
refugees.  
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has submitted that current 
asylum law and practice in Hungary does not comply with international or 
European human rights standards; concluding that, at the moment, 
‘virtually nobody can access international protection in Hungary.’69 The 
designation of Serbia as safe meant that all entries through the Serbian 
border were considered ill-founded despite objections from the UN 
Committee Against Torture and the Hungarian Supreme Court which had 
determined the designation to breach the ECHR.70 The Hungarian 
government have stated that the implementation of the safe country 
designation will have retroactive effect, thereby applying to Dublin 
transfers.71 The European Commission has now recognised that this 
                                                 
Reveals Plans To Breach Eu Asylum Law And To Subject Asylum- Seekers To Massive 
Detention And Immediate Deportation (4 March 2015); Amnesty International, Amnesty 
International Fenced Out: Hungary’s Violations Of The Rights Of Refugees And Migrants 
Press Release (October 2015)  
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constitutes a clear and persistent breach of human rights and refugee law 
by the Orban government and finally referred Hungary to the CJEU  in July 
2018.72 The response of the Hungarian government continues to equate 
migration with a threat to European values and suggests there will be no 
easy resolution.73    
Institutional recognition that the underpinning mutual trust principle was 
not always appropriate came in the recast Article 3(2) of Dublin Regulation 
(III):74 
 where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State 
primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial 
grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum 
procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that 
Member State….the determining Member State shall continue to 
examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish 
whether another Member State can be designated as responsible. 
 
The CJEU has subsequently stressed the importance of mutual trust whilst 
acknowledging that exceptional circumstances, such as comparatively poor 
health care, (not just systemic deficiencies) could prevent a Dublin 
transfer.75  The above judgements give an insight into a system that is far 
from uniform and a judicial body that is anxious to stress solidarity and 
mutual trust notwithstanding repeated breaches of CEAS provisions on 
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reception and asylum procedures. The EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency has 
recently raised concerns over restricted interpretations of refugee law 
where humanitarian protection is replaced with temporary residence orders 
(Italy), restrictions in accessing legal representation from detention centres 
(Croatia), welfare restrictions (Austria) and the classification of asylum files 
as secret, thereby preventing an effective judicial review (Poland).76 The 
realisation of the uniform, fair and efficient asylum system promised in the 
European Council’s Tampere summit in 1999, appears further away than 
ever.  
It may be suggested that the problems arising from over-stretched asylum 
systems in individual border states are no longer isolated. European 
cooperation in the field of asylum, such as it exists, has moved from a focus 
on protection to one of containment and deterrence. To understand how 
this shift has occurred it is necessary to consider the events of 2015-16 
and the impact of the crisis frame. This has enabled the tacit endorsement 
of an unchallenged narrative presenting those displaced as threats to 
European security, values and culture.  
 
The application and impact of the Crisis Frame  
The UNHCR labelled 2015 the year of Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ as an 
estimated one million irregular migrants, 75% of whom were fleeing conflict 
or persecution in Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq and therefore had claims for 
protection, arrived at Europe’s borders.77 They further estimate that 3,550 
lives had been lost at sea during this journey. 
Some media sources were keen to dilute the humanitarian dimension of the 
descriptor, preferring to describe events as a ‘migrant’ rather than ‘refugee’ 
crisis.78 The following year was described in similar terms. Within the first 
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6 months of 2016, the death toll was approaching that of the previous year 
as thousands continued to drown in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. It 
is impossible to be clear about the numbers who did not succeed in reaching 
Europe as many will have been intercepted, detained and otherwise 
prevented from travelling onwards by border guards.79 The situation was, 
and continues to remain, dire, despite a reduction in media interest and a 
relative fall in application numbers.  
The application of the crisis frame to describe events which were both 
foreseeable and manageable is deeply problematic. Frames have been 
defined as conceptual tools which are relied on by politicians, media and 
individuals to ‘convey, interpret and evaluate information’.80 Essentially, 
they assist people to make sense of events which they are unable to 
personally verify.  
When one thinks of a crisis one immediately conceives of a situation both 
unexpected and impossible to resolve (therefore out of control). Crisis 
framing in the migration context supports a security narrative through its 
characterisation of the situation as uncontrollable and intrinsically 
threatening, resulting in the dehumanisation of those seeking protection.81 
Yet as has been noted, the scale of the internal displacement, the ongoing 
nature and severity of the conflict, and instability in regional countries, 
suggests that the onward migration to Europe was predictable and 
therefore potentially manageable.  
Whilst a proportion of the arrivals are from established countries of origin 
such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea, a considerable proportion of asylum 
seekers are now Syrian. The UN contends that well over half the pre-war 
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population in Syria requires humanitarian assistance.82 More than 3.5 
million Syrians currently reside in Turkey and 1.2 million are in Lebanon. It 
cannot therefore be credibly argued that the reception and processing of 
one million Syrian asylum claims between 28 comparatively wealthy 
European countries is unmanageable. The European ‘refugee crisis’ if 
indeed it exists at all, is not a crisis that should be attributed to refugees. 
Rather, it is a crisis of European governance which has failed to deliver a 
workable and fair solution that protects those most in need.  
Lessons should have been learned from the significant increase in asylum 
claims resulting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, when the political 
dimension of the European project was in its infancy. The lack of planning 
is even more alarming given the existence of a specific European directive 
that covers this very situation. 
  
Lessons from Yugoslavia 
The protracted dissolution of Yugoslavia which began in 1990 generated a 
comparable number of refugees in Europe. This was the first significant 
spike in asylum applications and, along with the collapse of the Berlin wall, 
led several governments in Western Europe to focus their attention on 
specific asylum policies. In the UK for example, the first appeals system 
was established in 1993 and was soon followed by a proliferation of asylum 
legislation that has continued to this day. Refugee movements were a 
foreign policy concern in Europe but the response to the protection 
demands of over two million Yugoslav refugees was a matter of national 
competence. Similar arguments over cooperation and responsibility 
surfaced as Croatia closed its border to Bosnia due to the lack of support 
from European neighbours. A threat to repeat this decision was made in 
2018.83    
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On the whole the individual state response to the Yugoslav refugees was 
strikingly similar to that of 2015-16 with Germany taking responsibility for 
the majority of those displaced, granting protection to over 330,000.84  
Sweden received 50,000 asylum claims whereas the UK, France and 
Belgium received less than 10,000 applications each.85 Not only are the 
responses comparable, the numbers are also broadly comparable, with only 
Germany taking significantly more Syrian than Yugoslav nationals.86  
The intervening years have seen significant developments in terms of 
European competence with the establishment of a CEAS in 1999. Yet, 
surprisingly little has changed on the ground. The same arguments over 
integration, security and the allocation of responsibility continue to 
dominate political discussions, delaying effective and prompt response. The 
urgent humanitarian need for protection is relegated to a secondary 
concern. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the EU-Turkey deal and 
the worrying signs that extra-territorial processing is back on the European 
agenda. 
Justin Huynh argues that a model for a managed resettlement programme 
existed following the exodus of 1.6 million Vietnamese in the 1970’s. The 
orderly departure programme, which included an open shore policy in 
neighbouring countries and resettlement in the US, could have served as a 
workable model and may well have prevented many of the deaths in the 
Mediterranean.87 Huynh argues that the willingness to accept Vietnamese 
nationals for resettlement in the US was motivated largely by guilt. By 
contrast there has been a ‘sense of compassionate distance for the plight 
of Syrian refugees’, notwithstanding the increasing globalisation of the 
conflict.88  
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 The Temporary Protection Directive89  
The need to respond quickly and effectively in cases of war, widespread 
violence and human rights violations, prompted the European institutions 
to enact a Directive in 2001 with the purpose of providing immediate, 
temporary protection in cases of mass arrival. The Yugoslav displacement 
directly informs the preamble. In particular the Commission and Member 
States are reminded to ‘learn the lessons of their response to the Kosovo 
crisis in order to establish the measures in accordance with the Treaty’90. 
The Syrian conflict is an obvious case for the implementation of the 
temporary protection mechanism. The principles it sets out are those that 
informed the Commission’s failed attempts to implement a mandatory 
quota system in 2016. Had the Council activated the Directive’s provisions 
as soon as the Syrian conflict began to generate a significant number of 
refugees, there could have been a managed approach grounded in existing 
obligations. When the number of arrivals increased significantly in 2015, 
Syrians could have been dispersed according to the responsibility sharing 
mechanism in a more orderly fashion. It would certainly have been more 
difficult for the Visegrad group of states to argue against the Commission’s 
competence when setting mandatory quotas. 
Instead the European Council struggled to obtain support for its compulsory 
quota scheme. The CJEU dismissed a challenge by Slovakia and Hungary 
(supported by Poland) to the Council’s competence in setting mandatory 
quotas to assist with the relocation of Syrians from Greece and Italy.91 Both 
states argued that the use of Article 78(3) TFEU was inappropriate as it 
constituted a binding exception to a legislative act and further they alleged 
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several procedural irregularities, most notably the absence of a unanimous 
Council vote.92 Although the Court dismissed all the arguments, the efficacy 
of the scheme was seriously undermined. The Czech Republic admitted only 
12 of their target of 2691, whereas Slovakia admitted 16 from a quota of 
902. Both Hungary and Poland resolutely refused to comply.93 Infringement 
action was commenced by the Commission in 2017 but by this time the 
mandatory scheme had been replaced with voluntary commitments. 
The absence of effective European solidarity is deeply regrettable. It is 
possible, although admittedly not inevitable, that the use of an established 
provision in the Temporary Protection Directive might have attracted less 
objection. The provisions of the Directive are time-limited, both in terms of 
duration and the protection it offers, but it does provide for principles of 
family reunion and recognises that recipients may make a claim for refugee 
status at any point.94   
The lack of preparedness and crisis mentality left the European Commission 
on the back foot, appearing disorganised and reactive. Governments that 
had no intention of offering protection were provided with an excuse which 
could be used to appeal directly to their electorates. These appeals centred 
on national identity and security concerns with Viktor Orban stating that 
allowing entry for refugees means ‘importing terrorism, criminalism, anti-
semitism and homophobia’. The Polish interior minister argued that the 
relocation of refugees was ineffective as it ‘simply attracted more waves of 
immigration to Europe’.95     
The Commission’s capacity to enforce compliance was further limited by a 
growing existential threat to the Union itself. Many of the leaders refusing 
to abide by humanitarian obligations were also espousing nationalist views 
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and questioning the authority and foundations of the Union. The Italian 
interior Minister Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orban have now formed an anti-
refugee alliance that is directly oppositional to European policies:  
Hungary has shown that we can stop migrants on land. Salvini has 
shown migrants can be stopped at sea. We thank him for protecting 
Europe’s borders…..We must send migrants back to their countries. 
Brussels says we cannot do it. They also had said it was impossible 
to stop migrants on land, but we did it.96 
If their rhetoric is to be believed, the European Commission’s capacity to 
compel states in such a climate would be like Turkey’s voting for Christmas.  
The crisis frame has been welcomed by populist and extremist politicians 
and has helped facilitate and secure a path to power in national 
governments for previously marginalised far-right figures such as Matteo 
Salvini in Italy, Alice Weidel in Germany and Jimmie Akesson in Sweden. It 
has served to consolidate the power of Viktor Orban in Hungary and 
President Erdogan in Turkey. The fast-growing popularity of the far-right in 
Europe is, one could argue, the real crisis. It was not widely foreseen and 
its volatile, populist appeal certainly threatens the values of the European 
project.  
 
The burden of crisis and its impact on cooperation  
The depiction of the refugee as a burden is common in anti-migrant 
rhetoric. Yet it also dominates much of the policy pertaining to the CEAS 
which purports to provide a fair and efficient asylum procedure.97 Terms 
such as ‘venue-shopping’ and ‘burden-sharing’ frame the refugee as a 
problem to be managed, de-individualising the refugee experience.     
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The dissolution of Yugoslavia bought burden-sharing questions to the fore 
in discussions over how to manage external displacement. The German 
Presidency Draft Council Resolution on Burden-sharing in July 1994 
attempted to allocate reception responsibility and institute a resettlement 
mechanism based on three equally weighted factors:  population size, size 
of Member State territory and GDP.98 Thielemann notes that the proposal 
was watered down after objection from the British government and French 
concerns over the rights of refugees.99 The resulting agreement was based 
on soft law and non-binding commitments which were found wanting in the 
subsequent Kosovo crisis.100 
There are obvious parallels with the Council’s decision to introduce a 
compulsory quota system. Despite continued resistance from the Visegrad 
group101, the Commission sought to create a more durable plan the 
following year, including a solidarity compensation mechanism where those 
states taking higher number of asylum seekers were financially 
compensated.102 The idea of refugees being traded in this way may seem 
distasteful but this did not deter the Commission who recognised that an 
entirely voluntary scheme was not able to offer an effective solution for the 
numbers requiring protection.  
Burden-sharing also informs the transfer system under the Dublin 
Regulation which has been the subject of so much criticism. Even if one 
accepts that burden is a legitimate word to describe refugees, in practice 
the transfer is not a good example of burden sharing. Many states located 
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away from the borders of Europe, in particular the UK, have been far keener 
to maintain the Dublin system precisely for this reason. The transfer 
mechanism has actually constituted a burden in the full definitional sense 
for countries in South-Eastern Europe. Italy had 42,356 irregular border 
crossings i 
n two months alone in 2016.103 The figures for Greece and Hungary were 
even greater with 137,000 and 78,472 respectively for the same period.104 
The European Commission commenced infringement proceedings against 
Hungary after the introduction of its new asylum laws in December 2015 
and mounting evidence that refugee law was not being respected. 
Nevertheless some European states continued to transfer asylum seekers 
during this period with 1,338 successful transfers to Hungary between 
January and Nov 2015 (from 39,299 requests).105  
Until the decision of Germany in August 2015 to suspend the Dublin transfer 
mechanism for Syrian nationals, states of first arrival were expected to 
manage the overwhelming majority of irregular arrivals along with those 
transferred. This was less about cooperation and sharing responsibility and 
more about shifting responsibility for refugee management by wealthier 
northern European states.  
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Carrera argues that the resulting temporary reforms to the Dublin 
mechanism failed to fully appreciate that the situation was neither an 
emergency nor particularly exceptional.106 An opportunity to re-consider 
the premise and objectives of the Regulation was therefore missed. Even if 
one accepts the contested premise that people should remain in the first 
country of asylum, it is improbable that secondary movement will be 
prevented whilst asylum procedures and reception conditions in European 
states are not aligned.107 
It is suggested that framing the refugee as a burden undermines the 
possibility of their positive contribution to society and contributes to the 
anti-migrant narrative which focuses exclusively on the threat to national 
identity, prosperity and safety. The Oxford English dictionary provides three 
definitions of the noun burden: 
• A load, typically a heavy one. 
• A duty or misfortune that causes worry, hardship, or distress. 
• The main responsibility for achieving a specified aim or task.108 
 
Whilst the final definition may be in the minds of policy-makers, it is 
reasonable for a burden to be interpreted using either of the first two 
definitions, stressing a negative, unwanted obligation that is unlikely to 
produce a particularly positive outcome. 
Rather than emphasising the negative, it is submitted that ‘responsibility 
sharing’ would provide a more constructive platform for negotiations 
between states and the Commission. Whilst certain states may continue to 
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prove reluctant to comply with their humanitarian obligations, it is arguably 
harder for them to justify reneging on shared responsibilities (when 
compared with shared burdens).   
The European response to Syrian displacement 
The crisis mentality that overtook the European Commission in 2015 
characterised a fragmented and reactive response to the Syrian 
displacement. Its effects continue to be felt today by Syrians stranded in 
Turkey and Greece, not to mention those returned at European borders 
who have been denied an opportunity to exercise their right to seek asylum. 
 
Resettlement 
For many refugees the ultimate goal is to return home (an understanding 
typically lost in the anti-refugee narrative found in sections of the European 
media).109 The decision to leave is rarely taken lightly (this explains why 
the number of Syrian refugees remained fairly constant for the first four 
years of the conflict and why there are still millions of internally displaced 
Syrians. Yet it is difficult to conceive of return in the foreseeable future as 
a viable option for Syrians. President Assad has recently legislated to 
require owners of private property to register their interest within thirty 
days.110 Those unable or unwilling to do so, which will include millions of 
internally and externally displaced Syrians, will risk confiscation of their 
property. Such measures will prevent the return and reintegration of those 
in exile; suggesting continuing instability for decades to come.   
 
Given the impossibility of return in the short-medium term and the 
significant costs falling on comparatively poor neighbouring states, the 
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best, durable solution will be resettlement. The scale of the resettlement 
required is considerable and cannot be achieved absent a global response.  
The EU has operated a voluntary resettlement scheme since 2011 and 
several Member States operate their own schemes which are typically 
managed by the UNHCR in the region. The UNHCR has urged the EU to 
increase commitments to receive refugees through sustainable 
resettlement programmes, endorsing the 2012 campaign led by the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and five non-governmental 
organisations active in the field of refugee protection, to resettle 20,000 
people every year by 2020.   
The need for European coordination in meeting this target seems obvious 
as recognised by the Commission’s Agenda for Migration in 2015.111 Many 
Member States were not offering any resettlement places and surveys of 
voluntary programmes showed that few states fulfilled their own self-
imposed resettlement quotas.112 There are a variety of reasons for this, 
including failures by the UNHCR to identify appropriate persons, 
unwillingness of municipalities to partake in resettlement initiatives and the 
imposition of suitability criteria, such as integration potential, which are 
potentially discriminatory and difficult for the UNHCR to assess.113  
Additionally, one of the concerns surfacing in resettlement research is the 
emergence of a two tier asylum system in some European countries which 
distinguishes between asylum seekers arriving at the border and those 
resettled from the region of origin. This can prevent a holistic integration 
strategy which is essential to the sustainability of resettlement.114   
After three years of the conflict, the UK had resettled only 143 Syrians 
under its Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme.115 Whilst David Cameron 
increased the commitment to resettle 20,000 within five years from 2015 
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there have been accusations that the scheme principally benefits the most 
vocal rather than the most vulnerable. There are also concerns that the 
significant resources devoted to Syrians under the scheme could be more 
equitably shared across the refugee community in the UK. Other 
resettlement programmes such as the Gateway Protection Programme and 
the Mandate Refugee Scheme assist those formally identified as Convention 
refugees but the number of beneficiaries is comparatively small. 
The US operates a temporary protected status to allow nationals of specific 
countries, including Syria, to remain and work for a fixed, renewable period. 
But the recent removal of several countries from the list and the anti-
immigrant rhetoric of President Trump leaves the future of the policy in 
doubt.  
Compared to the UK and the US, Germany has been more active in 
resettlement with a private sponsorship programme introduced in 2013; a 
national humanitarian program which focussed on Syrians living in Lebanon 
and a scheme introduced in January 2017 to resettle 500 persons each 
month from Turkey.116 Germany also contributes to the European Union 
resettlement scheme and has committed to 10,200 places over the next 
two years. 
The schemes are to be welcomed but the lack of an effective European 
strategy has meant that there is a considerable mismatch between demand 
and response. Amnesty International has reported that many of the most 
vulnerable remain in neighbouring countries, unable to access essential 
medical treatment for life-limiting conditions.117 Bokshi recommends EU 
coordination, the twinning of new and experienced resettlement countries, 
the development of a media strategy to promote resettlement locally and 
a clearer focus on integration challenges: 
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For resettlement to fulfil its functions as a meaningful demonstration 
of solidarity with countries of 1st asylum and as a useful component 
of a comprehensive durable solution strategy, resettlement numbers 
need to be significant and proportional to Europe’s prosperity relative 
to countries of 1st asylum.118    
 
When the number of irregular arrivals started to increase in 2015 the 
European Commission finally opted for concerted European action and the 
next two years saw the resettlement of over 25,000 Syrians from 
neighbouring countries.119 Given the small number and the Commission’s 
view that managed resettlement would help to reduce the number of people 
engaging in onward irregular migration, one might be forgiven for thinking 
that cooperation would be easy to secure. The proposed resettlement 
scheme covered all Member States and used distribution criteria that 
included GDP, size of population, unemployment rate and past numbers of 
asylum seekers/ resettled refugees.120 It also took account of any voluntary 
resettlement initiatives applied by Member States. An extra EUR 50 million 
in 2015/2016 was made available to support the scheme.121 An EU 
Regulation was proposed establishing a permanent resettlement framework 
with a unified procedure and common criteria in July 2016.122  
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Although the voluntary resettlement scheme has been extended to other 
nationalities with a target of 50,000 places by October 2019, it is notable 
that several states have failed to provide any resettlement places and many 
continue to fall far short of achieving the resettlement target.123 
Relocation  
In addition to resettlement from the region of origin, the Commission 
proposed an emergency relocation mechanism for those already present on 
EU soil to alleviate the pressure on Southern border states.124 The proposed 
relocation mechanism activated the ‘emergency situation’ provision 
contained in Article 78(3) of the TFEU and constituted a derogation from 
the Dublin Regulation.125 
The plan foresaw 160,000 relocation places to be implemented over a two-
year period. 66,400 places were for people to be relocated from Greece and 
39,000 from Italy to other EU countries. The remaining 54,000 were to be 
relocated from Hungary but due to their continued rejection of the plan, 
they were to be allocated at a later stage.126 Those eligible needed to come 
from countries of origin from which there was a 75% asylum success 
rate.127 Whilst pragmatic, the collective assessment of an asylum claimants 
legitimacy based on nationality is very crude and inevitably leads to a two 
tier system as many nationalities are excluded from the benefits of 
relocation despite having credible claims (including Afghans, Iraqis and 
Eritreans ).  
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Member States would receive 6,600 euros per person to assist with the 
transfer and could only reject the relocated person after undertaking an 
assessment, on national security or public order grounds. This was 
subsequently amended to allow states to notify the Commission and the 
council of temporary incapacity to participate in the relocation for up to 
30% of the assigned applicants, for duly justified reasons.128  
Whilst devised as an emergency response, there was some consideration 
given to integration prospects in the subsequent Commission 
communication. Language factors and family networks should be 
considered when deciding on the most appropriate state for relocation and 
where there is additional need for support or specialist health care this 
factor should be taken into account. However, NGO’s and the European 
Asylum Support Office report that such factors are not regularly 
considered.129 Whilst the durability of the mechanism depends on such 
factors, it must be recognised that refugees are far more likely to struggle 
to build a new life in certain states. Interviews with relocated asylum 
seekers in Romania found that language barriers and low wages made it is 
almost impossible to obtain meaningful employment. Language courses are 
not readily accessible and refugees are expected to support themselves 
after 6-12 months of basic state support.130 This might help to explain why 
Romania had only settled 463 from a total of 6,205 during the first year of 
relocation.  
The lamentable resettlement rate and the considerable difficulties 
experienced by arrivals in some countries, demonstrate the weakness of 
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leadership in the lack of planning and structured support resulting from the 
‘crisis’ mentality that overtook the Commission in 2015. For any relocation 
mechanism to be sustainable it needs to better match the preferences of 
refugees with those of Member States. Whilst states can indicate their 
preferences, they are accused of doing so with the intention of reducing 
rather than enhancing their reception obligations.131 If refugees are going 
to be relocated to countries where they will struggle to integrate there 
needs to be much more financial support and training (perhaps mentoring 
by states with more successful schemes) for the receiving state to build 
reception and integration capacity. 
A more immediate issue faces an estimated 50,000 migrants stranded in 
Greece. Some arrived before the EU-Turkey in March 2016 deal and are 
awaiting relocation under voluntary programmes, others arrived after the 
EU-Turkey deal took effect and their only way of leaving Greece is family 
reunion. Family reunion is provided for under the Dublin Regulation.132 The 
transfer should take place before the asylum claim has been assessed so 
that family life is facilitated with the best interests of the child being a 
primary consideration.133 Many have credible family reunion claims as 
family members, including young children separated at borders, are 
themselves stranded in other EU states. The administrative process for 
assessing relocation and family reunion has been lengthy and convoluted. 
Those interviewed by Action Aid were not properly informed about their 
legal position or given information about the reunion process.134 Family 
reunion figures from 2015 suggested that around three quarters of 
applications resulted in transfer, but this figure had dropped markedly to 
10% a year later.135 
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The reactive starting position of discussions on the Commission’s 2015 
Agenda for Migration did not bode well. Not only were the Visegrad states 
vociferous in their opposition to compulsory resettlement, the Agenda itself 
lacked definitive priorities. This is evidenced by the attention paid to the 
prevention of smuggling over the need to explore legitimate options for 
regular migration.136 Apetroe argues that a focus on legal migration 
pathways would have enabled the EU to take some initiative, thus regaining 
leadership of the debate.137 Instead the Commission expended its energy 
and resources on promoting greater securitisation and interception of 
smuggling networks; essentially confirming a securitisation narrative that 
has shaped migration discourse whilst increasing public anxieties over 
security and terrorism.138 Not only are such programmes unlikely to yield 
significant impact whilst the root causes remain unaddressed, there is also 
ample evidence from Operation Sophia and Triton that they endanger lives 
by prioritising security over rescue.139   
The compulsory relocation mechanism ended in September 2017 falling 
well short of its target. A move to voluntary relocation resulted in slightly 
more than half the target being met as of October 2018. This was partly 
down to problems with registering those eligible, but it was also very 
apparent that some countries were either unwilling or incapable of properly 
engaging with the mechanism. The relocation mechanism itself did little to 
deter irregular migrants. Over 3,000 drowned in the first six months of 
2016 with three-quarters of the deaths occurring on the route between 
Libya and Italy. Conditions for all migrants in Libya are known to be dire. 
There is no established UNHCR presence and many migrants are detained 
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in overcrowded, insanitary conditions.140 One of the most harrowing reports 
related to a CNN investigation which uncovered migrants being sold in slave 
markets around Tripoli.141 Notwithstanding accusations from NGO’s and the 
UNHCR that the Libyan government are complicit in crimes against 
humanity, the EU has recently attempted to persuade the Libyan authorities 
to build  EU funded, migrant processing centres. So far, the Libyan 
government have rejected the proposal.142 Meanwhile the EU has assisted 
in supporting the Libyan coastguard as it continues to intercept and return 
migrants attempting to cross to Europe whilst actively preventing NGO 
vessels from engaging in rescue operations.143  
 
The Turkish solution  
As has been demonstrated, the emergency relocation mechanism had little 
effect in securing relocation or reducing the number of irregular arrivals in 
Greece and Italy. Of particular concern was the increasing number of 
arrivals coming from Turkey to the Greek islands. This led the Commission 
to devise its controversial ‘Plan B’, the EU-Turkey deal.144   
The deal saw the outsourcing of refugee protection from Europe to Turkey 
and constitutes the clearest example to date of the commodification of 
asylum. The success of the deal depends entirely on perspective. It 
certainly reduced the number of daily arrivals in Greece from thousands to 
tens. After only four months, Christine Nikolaidou, from the International 
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Organisation for Migration in Greece, explained that the threat of 
deportation and detention was working, ‘Flows have decreased not just 
because of the agreement but because of the closure of the borders – 
refugees and migrants have received the message that the borders are 
shut.’145  
This is a disturbing observation as it suggests that the obligation of non-
refoulement is being routinely ignored. It is difficult to see any significant 
difference between closing borders and interdicting vessels at sea. In the 
Hirsi Jamaa judgement, the ECtHR ruled that the interception and return of 
a boat to Libya which contained irregular migrants, including asylum 
seekers, was a breach of the prohibition on inhuman treatment contrary to 
Article 3, and collective expulsion contrary to Protocol 4, Article 4 along 
with the right to an effective remedy in the European Convention146. 
From a human rights perspective the Turkey deal is a truly bad deal. The 
closures of borders will never solve a humanitarian emergency. Whilst it 
may have an impact on the numbers of people migrating out of choice, the 
majority of irregular migrants come from countries where there are serious 
human rights abuses. It has been well established that absent a viable 
alternative of return, migrants will search for other, more dangerous 
routes.147 In this respect EU policy directly contributes to the 
unprecedented growth in smuggling and trafficking.148 A recent analysis of 
Operation Sophia which operated off the coast of Libya found that irregular 
migration increased by 19% in the first half of 2017 compared to the same 
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period in 2016. The number of arrivals from Libya and the number of deaths 
in the central Mediterranean has increased considerably since 2015.149 
Although many migrants taking the Libyan route will be from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the UNHCR states that around 11% of arrivals from Libya in 2018 
are Syrian nationals.150 From a geographical perspective this makes little 
sense. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the movement 
restrictions imposed by the EU-Turkey deal are at least contributory factors.  
Put simply the deal states that those whose claims are deemed inadmissible 
in Greece should be returned to Turkey. At the outset, as reported in 
several press releases, the deal stated that all irregular migrants will be 
returned, which would clearly breach the procedural requirements pursuant 
to the principle of non-refoulement, as well as the EU Charter and ECHR’s 
prohibition on collective expulsion. The subsequent clarification and the use 
of the word inadmissible rather than unfounded is still significant as it 
suggests that the application has not be assessed on its merits. A claim 
could be considered inadmissible for example if the applicant had arrived 
via a safe 3rd country or if Turkey is considered to be a first country of 
asylum. Following the transfer, the Turkish government commits to 
relocate one Syrian refugee from Turkey to the EU according to the 
relocation quota.  
The deal was funded at a cost of 6 billion euros paid in instalments to 
various organisations delivering education and other services on the 
ground. In return for Turkey’s cooperation, the EU promised to relax visa 
requirements for Turkish nationals and to reopen negotiations towards EU 
membership. The latter seems unlikely to progress anytime soon as only 
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one of the 35 chapters required under the accession procedure has been 
successfully closed in a decade of negotiation.  
The programme commenced on 20th March 2016 and resulted in a 
significant reduction in the number of arrivals in Greece. However, return 
procedures to Turkey have been slow and only 12,489 of an estimated 3.5 
million Syrians in Turkey have been resettled in EU countries.151  
There are considerable concerns over the legality and morality of the deal. 
The question of whether Turkey can be deemed a first country of asylum 
or a safe country under the Asylum Procedures Directives is crucial when 
assessing its legitimacy.  
The EU Asylum Procedures Directive defines a ‘safe third country’ as a 
country where: the people concerned do not have their life or liberty 
threatened on ground of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion’; there is ‘no risk of serious harm’ 
in the sense of the EU definition of subsidiary protection (death penalty, 
torture et al, civilian risk in wartime); the people concerned won’t be sent 
to another country which is unsafe (the non-refoulement rule); and ‘the 
possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to 
receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention’.152  Turkey 
could also be considered a first country of asylum if the applicant had 
received refugee status in Turkey or would otherwise be guaranteed 
sufficient protection.  
Whichever descriptor is preferred, the Commission have unequivocally 
stated that ‘Only asylum seekers that will be protected in accordance with 
the relevant international standards and in respect of the principle of non-
refoulement will be returned to Turkey’.153 The UNHCR has emphasised the 
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importance of effective protection and the need to examine the practice of 
states and compliance with the relevant instruments.154  
Herein lies the problem. Turkey does not apply the Refugee Convention to 
non-European refugees, having not ratified the 1967 optional protocol, and 
there is little prospect of Syrian refugees in Turkey being able to formalise 
their temporary status and settle permanently. President Erdoğan recently 
clarified his position, ‘We want our refugee brothers and sisters to return 
to their land, to their homes. We are not in the position to hide 3.5 million 
here forever.’155 Thus the fourth requirement for a country to be deemed 
‘safe’ does not appear satisfied.  
There is also a considerable risk of onward refoulement which has been 
overlooked by the Commission. Recent reports from NGO’s on the ground 
suggest that nine provinces have stopped registering Syrian nationals with 
the result that they are unable to access healthcare and other basic 
services.156 In a letter to the Interior Ministry in February, Human Rights 
Watch alleged that Turkish border guards have been shooting at Syrians to 
prevent them crossing the border.157 
As Peers has argued, although the general human rights situation in Turkey 
is not directly relevant to an assessment of effective protection when 
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returning refugees, it is absolutely crucial to an assessment of whether 
Turkey can be described as a ‘safe country of origin’ for Turkish nationals; 
something that Peers describes as ‘utterly preposterous’.158      
The European Commission proposes to include Turkey on a common list of 
safe countries and plans to replace the Asylum Procedures Directive with a 
directly applicable European Regulation. This is notwithstanding Eurostat 
figures indicating that 23% of asylum applications from Turkish nationals 
are well-founded and the fact that Turkey currently appears on only one 
national safe country list (that of Bulgaria).159  
The safe country designation allows an accelerated procedure, including 
border and transit zones, with no minimum time limit under Article 31(8)(b) 
of the Asylum Procedures Directive. The Commission has emphasised that 
the fast-track approach should not compromise the obligation to examine 
individual applications, but this appears more an act of faith than an 
enforceable commitment. Article 31(9) of the Asylum Procedures Directive 
requires Member States to set ‘reasonable’ time limits for the first instance 
decision to be reached, and Article 39(2) leaves Member States discretion 
to set time limits for applicants to exercise their right to an effective 
remedy. As expected, the degree of discretion has meant that time frames 
for accelerated first and second instance asylum procedures vary 
significantly160. 
The move from a Directive, affording Member States some autonomy in 
implementation, to a directly applicable Regulation and the controversy 
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concerning the inclusion of Turkey led the Council to suspend negotiations 
on the common safe country list in April 2017.   
For the EU-Turkey deal to stand up to its critics, Turkey must be considered 
a safe third country. It is not impossible, as Peers notes, for this to be 
satisfied even if it is not deemed a safe country of origin. However, there 
are significant arguments that Turkey is not safe in either sense. This 
illustrates how human rights are being side-lined in European politics.161 To 
blame this on the ‘refugee crisis’ is myopic and misguided. The 
marginalisation of human rights by European institutions was visible in the 
selective application of the political dimension of the Copenhagen criteria 
during the accession process.162 It is at least arguable that greater 
accountability on the political criteria would have required the Visegrad 
countries to improve their anti-discrimination and human rights legislation, 
better preparing them to fulfil their resettlement obligations.  
 
Re-framing the Syrian displacement 
Strategic framing analysis has been applied in a variety of social policy 
contexts. Magner and Gerstein Pineau consider how to build support for 
progressive immigration reform in the United States, arguing that advocates 
must turn away from ‘us versus them’ framing, towards language that 
emphasises shared humanity, collective prosperity, and the country’s distinct 
identity as a ‘nation of immigrants’.163 This approach requires a departure from 
the vulnerable refugee trope which suggests dependency and a lack of agency. 
Hanafi laments the dominance of a politics of pity over compassion, empathy 
and justice164. Whilst vulnerability is used by the UNHCR to push for greater 
responsibility, many writers argue that it leads to a particular ‘hopeless’ 
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conception of the refugee. It then becomes more difficult for those not fitting 
this conception to acquire protection as they are dismissed as not deserving 
or credible.165  
Angela Merkel adopts a benefit perspective which goes beyond national 
borders, viewing refugee protection as intrinsic to the dignity of mankind,  
‘The German constitution and European values require the protection of 
people’s dignity. This means not only the dignity of the people in Germany 
but it also means the global understanding of the dignity of people’.166 
The emphasis on shared experience and common humanity is an attempt to 
shape public perceptions. Whilst Merkel’s compassionate response is still 
applauded by refugee advocates, she was of course punished by sections of 
her electorate. This demonstrates both that changing the prevailing narrative 
is far from straightforward and that the message needs to come from different 
respected sources to have sustained impact. Merkel’s lone voice of compassion 
became increasingly untenable as other countries closed their borders and 
sought to avoid any suggestion of moral responsibility.  
The domestic consequences of Merkel’s lone-voice compassion may be a 
consequence of the failings of intergovernmental cooperation on refugee 
protection. Shurke notes that when compared to defence and environmental 
cooperation, the benefits of refugee cooperation are not immediately obvious 
to states who may avoid costs by unilateral action.167  
Shurke applies a cost-benefit analysis to international cooperation and 
burden-sharing.168 She argues that refugee reception should be considered 
an international public good which benefits all states, irrespective of which 
country receives the protection seekers. A full analysis of the benefits are 
beyond the scope of this paper but she challenges the ‘threat’ rhetoric of 
Orban and Salvini, arguing that security is the principal benefit of refugee 
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cooperation, as measures to accommodate and protect will reduce the risk 
of refugees fuelling and spreading the conflict they are fleeing.169 There is 
of course an inherent risk in emphasising the security benefit of cooperation 
as it may unintentionally reinforce an imperialist, anti-muslim narrative.  
Walzer’s recent essay ‘The European Crisis’ argues that Europe must take 
more refugees to avoid waking up to a ‘grim day’ where liberalism is 
effectively over.170  
Shurke’s analysis further suggests that the security gain is not itself 
sufficient to encourage cooperation as any security threat to individual 
states could easily be managed. But cooperation offers other benefits 
resulting from greater predictability, such as a reduction in costs for both 
states and refugees. The enormous sums of money spent on securitising 
Europe’s borders has not had any lasting impact on reducing migratory 
flows.171 The reactive nature of crisis decision-making, such as the decision 
to end the Mare Nostrum search and rescue mission in the Mediterranean, 
has wasted money and cost many lives.172  
Conclusion 
The marginalisation of European values 
The events of summer 2015 should never have been framed as a crisis. 
They were a foreseeable response to an unsustainable situation in the 
region of origin. It should not have been beyond the capability of the 
European institutions to provide an effective, durable solution.173 The legal 
mechanism to start this process already existed. The failure to apply the 
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emergency measures of the Temporary Protection Directive is just one 
example of legal measures being side-lined. One could point to the failure 
of several states to comply with their reception obligations under the CEAS 
(deficiencies identified by the European courts going back eight years) and 
the refusal of some Member States to comply with the compulsory 
relocation quota. The underpinning values espoused in Article 2 of the 
Treaty of the EU – freedom, democracy, rule of law and respect for human 
rights (including those of minorities), are simply not taken seriously in the 
context of refugee protection. They are, in effect, values reserved for the 
European citizen. 
There is now an urgent need to reclaim these values and re-frame the 
refugee debate. It necessitates a departure from the ‘toxic narrative’ that 
has dictated much of European refugee policy.174 Cooperation centred on a 
frame of compassion and empathy would help to reinvigorate a European 
politics that has lost sight of the values underpinning European 
harmonisation. ‘Orbanisation’ is not confined to European asylum law and 
it needs to be contained before it dictates the next chapter of European 
history.175  
After mounting infringement proceedings in 2015 the Commission recently 
referred Hungary to the CJEU. Members of the European Parliament also 
voted to trigger Article 7 of the TEU on the basis that the policies and 
rhetoric of the Hungarian Government are threatening European values. 
The report prepared by MEP Judith Sargentini detailed many actions by 
Orban’s government with nine paragraphs devoted to the treatment of 
refugees and asylum seekers. In addition to the refusal to apply the 
mandatory quota and new laws on illegal migration and processing of 
asylum seekers in transit centres, the report refers to the case of Ahmed 
H, a Syrian national residing in Cyprus, who had tried to bring his family 
across the Serbia-Hungarian border and was sentenced to 7 years 
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imprisonment for terrorism offences in March this year.176 Orban defended 
his record, arguing that the Parliament should have sent a fact-finding 
mission to Hungary, conveniently omitting to mention that his Fidesz party 
had previously voted against a proposed mission. This is the first time the 
Parliament has voted to trigger Article 7, although the Commission has now 
initiated a censure action against Poland.  
The European Parliament’s censure is an important step towards reclaiming 
the narrative over European values but it remains to be seen whether the 
censure will have the desired effect. Fidesz MEP, Jozsef Szajer, a close 
advisor to Orban, has argued that Hungary is being punished by pro-
immigration politicians; ‘Hungary and the Hungarian people are being 
condemned because they proved that migration can be stopped and there 
is no need for migration’.177 So far the other  Visegrad governments have 
supported Hungary and it seems unlikely that Orban’s government will 
respond positively to any decision by the CJEU. 
This is a watershed moment for European values. If the Council under the 
Austrian presidency fails to act following the motion, there will be no 
effective sanction when a state openly refuses to accept the core values of 
the Union. Other states are already following Orban’s lead with right wing 
populists such as Nigel Farage and Matteo Salvini, praising his leadership. 
 
Reclaiming the narrative for refugee protection  
It has been argued that framing the Syrian displacement as a crisis has 
enabled ill-conceived, reactive policies that present refugees as criminals 
and terrorists; undermining the protection that is their entitlement under 
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international law. The consequences of this frame have reached beyond the 
refugee context and fed into an unprecedented rise in nationalist politics 
which threatens to unravel the Union. When democratic values are 
ringfenced for certain peoples to the exclusion of others, their universality 
is challenged and they cease to become core values in anything but name.     
Walzer argues that community cohesion depends, to a large extent, on the 
demarcation of strangers from members.178 Soysal also acknowledges that 
a cohesive national identity can be more difficult to achieve when there is 
religious, ethnic and cultural plurality.179 Nevertheless, freedom of 
movement for European citizens and their family members has already 
increased the diversity of most European populations.180 The arrival of 
Syrian refugees, when managed with appropriate resources directed 
towards integration, should not significantly impact national identity in 
already diverse communities.181 This is not the case for all European 
countries and allocation of European funds should reflect these additional 
challenges. A study of resettlement of Syrians in seven countries by the 
Rand corporation found that notwithstanding barriers, such as qualification 
alignment and language; integration was effective in countries where 
political commitment, community engagement and public support for 
refugees was strongest.182 This makes the framing of the debate about 
refugee protection crucial.   
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The European project has challenged demarcation within its borders 
through a conception of citizenship that allow freedom of movement for its 
citizens and their families. But the values that inform this project are now 
under threat, in part from the actions of some populist European 
governments, but also from the inability of the European institutions to 
coordinate an effective protection response to the Syrian displacement. 
Whilst the European Commission has expended considerable energy and 
resources trying to belatedly contain and deflect those refugees that 
manage to reach Europe, they have been blind to a much bigger threat of 
their own making. The lives of millions of Syrian refugees are effectively 
suspended as Europe reinforces its borders and looks inward.  
The application of an alternative frame, based on European values, 
empathy and international humanitarian obligations may have enabled a 
very different approach that might have exposed and embarrassed, rather 
than emboldened nationalist politicians. But such an approach necessitates 
cooperation of Member States under the decisive leadership of the 
European institutions. 
Regrettably, the window for deployment of a humanitarian frame may have 
long since passed. Once the dust settled on the EU-Turkey deal, proposals 
concerning extra-territorial processing, effectively buried in 2003, 
resurfaced. Originally proposed by Tony Blair183, plans to process asylum 
claims in camps outside the EU were widely criticised by refugee scholars, 
human rights organisations and many European governments. Fekete 
summed up the criticisms:  
Britain is proposing a new network of refugee camps - designated 
areas where those inside have different rights from those outside. To 
envisage such a plan is to imagine ghettoes created by the world's 
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most peaceful and richest countries in some of the world's poorest 
and most unstable regions.184 
 
In the last five years, the creation of ‘ghettoes in the world’s poorest and 
most unstable regions’ has become a reality by stealth. A concerted effort 
is needed by European institutions, civil society and moderate political 
parties, to align refugee protection to the values proclaimed in the TEU; 
reframing the narrative. To paraphrase Vaclav Havel, when considering his 
country’s treatment of the Roma minority, the response to Syrian refugees 
is a litmus test for civil society.185   
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